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     Purposes of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) include screening for single gene mutations for 
late onset disorders or susceptibility to cancer. The problematic issue is that PGD is to produce a healthy 
baby, causing the destruction of some embryos that have been transferred by in vitro fertilization (IVF). 
Some PGD embryos may be discarded because they are excess to the woman or couples’ goal for family 
creation, and have been diagnosed as being affected by a particular genetic condition that woman/couple 
wish to avoid. So, the controversial issue is the destruction of embryos as a consequence of fertility 
treatment that raises questions on whether the moral status of an embryo of 3 days is the same as that of a 
born, living adult human being. 
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INTRODUCTION 
     PGD is a procedure used before implantation to 
identify genetic disorders to avoid the birth of 
human beings with these conditions. This can 
prevent special certain genetic diseases or 
disorders from being transferred to the child [1]. 
PGD is used by couples who are at risk of having 
a child with a serious genetic condition, or in 
some cases, to couples who have experienced 
repeated miscarriage due to chromosome 
rearrangements such as reciprocal translocation 
[2]. Some object to doing research on embryos 
because of the chance of discarding embryos by 
PGD but some others accept it for any reason 
because they believe that embryos are too 
rudimentary in development to have rights or 
interests. The treatment goal of PGD is to produce 
a healthy baby; however, it entails discarding 
embryos which have not been selected for transfer 
to the women’s womb for implantation [3]. The 
moral issue of discarding embryos in research 
raises many questions which  are discussed here. 
RESEARCH LITERATURE 
     In fact, research on embryo can contribute to 
the development of treatments to lengthen lives, 
reduce suffering, and enable parents to have a 
child. It is hoped that studies on embryonic stem 
(ES) cells, toti potent or pluri-potent cells from an 
initial embryo brings about techniques for 
induction of stem cells to form organs and tissues 
in vitro for transplantation [4]. This can solve the 
gap between the demand of organ and its supply. 
To enhance the rates of transplantation success, it 
may be feasible to create tissues genetically 
identical to the recipient cells, thus solving the 
graft rejection issue. Tissues from ES cells can be 
employed as ‘cellular models’ for studying human 
ailments and examining novel medicine 
candidates for toxicity and efficacy [5]. This 
decreases the need for the conduction of harmful 
studies on people. Research on ES cell may 
develop novel treatments for infertility via 
generating gametes, eggs and sperm, from in-vitro 
ES cells [6,7]. These are employed to cure 




infertility in patients incapable of generating 
gametes since the gonads or ovaries were possibly 
taken away to treat cancer [8].ES cell lines can be 
produced without the destruction of embryos [9, 
10]. It is possible to directly generate stem cells 
from somatic cells through stimulating them to 
dedifferentiate into pluri-potent stem cells [11, 
15]. Development of stem-cell inquiry to generate 
functional tissues from ES cell lines or IPS cells 
involves the destruction of embryos. Toti potent 
stem cells are also embryos since they possess the 
same developmental capacity; thus, studying stem 
cells without destroying the embryo is not 
feasible. Most embryo studies conducted in the 
UK attempt to enhance IVF therapies [16]. 
Research on the development of embryo renders 
beneficial data on the reasons of congenital 
disease and miscarriage. Some believe that it is 
not sensible to annihilate unwanted embryos from 
IVF to confirm these benefits of the treatment. 
Perhaps, the most prevalent reasoning is that 
embryos are human beings, which is a moral 
claim about the embryo. Stating that a being is a 
person means to assume the same claims, rights, 
and motivations for other humans in identical 
conditions. It is not right to kill a human for the 
purpose of research, regardless of the fact that 
other individuals hope this person will survive. 
People who think that embryos are independent 
beings extend this conclusion to embryos as well. 
If embryos possess the same moral condition as 
ordinary people, is not humanistic to let them die 
in the same conditions [17]. The assumption that 
embryos are human has, however, some 
unavoidable inferences. An implication is the 
consideration of ‘embryo-rescue cases’ [18- 19]. 
Assume that numerous embryos are created as the 
by-products of assisted fertility. Nevertheless, 
they are frozen and kept in a big warehouse, 
possibly due to the fact that the government 
hinders destructing them. Imagine that a fire has 
begun in the wareroom, which may harm the 
embryos, but also may threaten the life of an 
employee. You are exposed to an alternative: 
either you should save the unwanted embryos or 
save the life of the employee. It is obvious that 
you have to save the worker’s life. On the other 
hand, if embryos are considered humans, you 
must save them as well, as it is morally expected 
to protect numerous persons in preference to a 
worker. Thus, our considerations are probably 
contradictory with the perspective that embryos 
are humans. This hypothetical case may examine 
this moral insight. Nevertheless, the implication 
that embryos are humans has some improbable 
perceptions for real life. More than 50% of 
embryos die in the first eight weeks of pregnancy, 
which is known as spontaneous abortion [20, 21]. 
Accordingly, more than 220 million embryos die 
in the world annually [22]. So, if it is assumed that 
embryos are humans, it is concluded that more 
than 220 million individuals die every year as a 
result of spontaneous abortion; it is seven times 
more than the number of people who lose their 
lives because of cancer. Hence, we should do 
something to decrease this astonishing death rate. 
Its biological basis should be indicated, and 
therapeutic measures should be prioritized to 
inhibit it, assuming that it may be a noticeable 
cause of human death compared with other causes 
altogether [19, 22- 25]. Conceivably, preventing 
many spontaneous abortions is hard, so the blight 
that kills embryos should be prevented. However, 
there are many resources to prevent diseases such 
as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
and cancer which kill fewer people. Two 
implausible inferences are pointed out regarding 
the assumption that embryos are humans. First, 
embryos may be saved in preference to other 
persons in cases of embryo rescue. Second, 
spontaneous abortion and loss of embryo should 
be considered a scientific priority. People who 
oppose these perceptions have two options. The 
first is to agree that embryos are not persons. If so, 
we cannot infer anymore that it is unsound to 
destroy embryos during research. The second 
alternative is to consider embryos as persons, but 
persons who presume themselves in particular 
conditions, with no normal right to be saved from 
natural or spontaneous mortalities, as sometimes, 
is similarly thought of the elderly. Few may think 
that the elderly people lack right to be saved. 
However, some argue that their claims to be saved 
are more feeble compared with those of the youth. 
Anything that possesses the name of a person can 
guarantee little moral assumption given either to 
embryos of human in cases of hypothetical 
embryo rescue or to sudden abortion. For instance, 
we might be negligent to any ailment killing 220 
million people yearly, even if it merely kills the 




elderly. Additionally, even if we endure the 
mortality of 220 million people from different 
illnesses, we would accord the same burial ritual 
dignity as we would accord to others. Neither of 
these is needed in early spontaneous abortion [19, 
26]. The mere alternative is to agree that embryos 
are not ordinary humans. Therefore, assuming 
them as persons is a claim that cannot be regarded 
in the argument on the destruction of unwanted 
embryos in research studies. Even if embryos are 
not normal humans, there are not sufficient moral 
causes not to destroy them, as we may possess 
drastic reasons not to destroy higher animals. 
Furthermore, this presumption is not eliminated 
by intuitive responses to cases of embryo rescue 
and sudden abortion, as those frameworks do not 
consist of killing embryos intentionally, but only 
getting disappointed in rescuing them. It is 
doubted, however, if there are justifiable motives 
not to destroy unwanted embryos. The oral 
contraceptive pill, post-coital contraception, and 
intra-uterine contraceptive tools all annihilate 
some embryos. Almost 200,000 abortions are 
recorded yearly in Britain (www.statistics.gov.uk), 
which induces objections among a minority. In 
addition, most countries ask that surplus embryos 
generated by IVF must be killed after some time 
(10 years in the UK). This is not commonly 
considered as morally repugnant or a kind of 
capital crime. Based on reactions to presumptive 
cases, there are no reasonable justifications against 
the destruction of embryos. Imagine that a 
refrigerator with 1,000 unwanted embryos has 
collapsed on a small child and is making her die. 
You may rescue the child, merely via turning the 
fridge upside down so that the embryos come out 
their test tubes and die. Obviously, you must 
rescue the child, asserting that destructive embryo 
study is morally permissible, if not needed. In 
fact, destructive study on unwanted embryos 
might be identical to the case of refrigerator. For 
example, by performing research on 1,000 
unwanted embryos, a scientist can possibly 
propose a cure. This research is expected to rescue 
one person; nevertheless, it also destroys all  
embryos. If it is judged that we can destroy the  
refrigerator case embryos, we have to also decide  
that it is permissible to kill the embryos in this  
case of research. It is hard to determine a decent 
view for the argument that suggests reasons for 
not destroying unwanted research embryos. One 
popular view suggests that we must not kill beings 
that possess mental capacities [27]. The common 
aspects are sensitivity to pleasure and pain, self-
consciousness, consciousness, and rationality. So, 
why these mental attributes do not permit us to 
kill? 
Daily judgments by people regarding the 
wrongness of killing are dependent on the mental 
potentials of the being that is going to be killed. 
Most of us accept that killing protozoa, bacteria, 
mollusks, or insects (organisms that are non-
rational, non-conscious, and insensitive to pain 
and pleasure) is permissible. In contrast, it is 
generally assumed wrong to kill dogs and pigs, 
which are nearly sensitive and conscious (also 
self-conscious) to pain and pleasure. Most 
individuals consider that humans lacking the 
crucial mental features possessed by adults also 
lack their claims, rights, and interests [28]. For 
instance, brain-dead persons in intensive-care 
units have considerably feeble claims to life-
saving cure compared with normal living 
individuals when the brain dies. Everything 
critical to his/her life also seems to die. Even 
permanently unconscious individuals who do not 
possess the standards for the death of brain have 
lost their interests and claims [29].Third, it is 
simple to make science-fiction stories, supporting 
the approach that the mental properties of a person 
influence the wrongness of killing. For instance, 
assume that it was feasible to transplant a brain of 
human to a sheep, preserving the personality, 
mental potentials, and memories. The outcome is 
a human mind and brain in a sheep. There will be 
strong reasons not to kill this being because we 
would think it is wrong to kill it. Also, consider a 
human mind with personality, memories, and 
mental capacities uploaded to a robot; of course it 
will possess the same mental features of an 
ordinary person. Will be there reasons not to 
switch this robot off? Clearly, there will be. 
Consider that we have reasons not to kill creatures 
with sensitivity to pleasure and pain, 
consciousness, self-consciousness, and rationality. 
This is consistent with the view that there is no 
significant reason to save embryos. Embryos have 
no consciousness [30, 31]. The beginning of fetal 
consciousness is reported to be at or after 24 
weeks [32, 33, 34, and 35]. Embryos cannot have 




pleasure and pain; this capability does not 
manifest before 16 weeks [31, 35, 36, and 37].  
They are not of course self-conscious or rational. 
Self-consciousness develops late in pregnancy or 
after being born, and rationality grows later [38, 
39]. Fourteen days after conception, embryos do 
not have even a nervous system. A second view 
considers a great value on membership of species 
[40]. Some creatures should not be killed because 
they are humans or some morally important 
species. To explain the special moral importance 
that they grant to being human, supporters of this 
perspective claim that humans have specific 
mentalities, such as rationality [41]. However, 
they justify the fact that human beings not having 
these features possess the same moral importance 
(i.e., being a member of a species with rationality 
is sufficient). The problem is that it is not obvious 
why membership of species has moral 
significance [42]. The attribution of beings to 
various species is dependent on different 
biological standards lacking moral relevance. 
Chimpanzees and humans are categorized as 
differing species on the basis of the fact that they 
are not able to generate reproductive offspring. 
This, however, does not justify the variations in 
human rights and those of the chimpanzees. In the 
same way, adult Australians and Americans can 
reproduce with one another and bear reproductive 
child. However, it is again unlikely that this is 
what determines their identical moral condition; a 
more desired explanation would be suitable to 
their similar mental characteristics [43, 44].A third 
view claims that we should not destroy a creature 
and thus deprive it of a valuable future. 
Accordingly, it is probably incorrect to kill 
embryos because some embryos will become 
individuals with precious lives [45].Unwanted 
embryos, however, do not have lives of value. If 
they are not killed in research, instead they are 
languished in freezers until they are killed for 
another reason. Killing these embryos in research 
will not deprive them from having a valuable 
future. There is a more unique view that 
eliminates this problem: we should not destroy an 
organism; if we do so, we would deprive it from a 
valuable future. However, this view is less 
attractive compared with the original one. It is not 
obvious what is incorrect with depriving 
something from a valuable life when we are sure 
this future will not come over. This viewpoint has 
not reasonable implications. Imagine we could 
have dedifferentiated skin cells of an adult and 
then developed them into embryos and children. 
Therefore, skin cells can have a valuable future; 
this is in line with the view that it would be wrong 
to kill numerous skin cells that are shed away 
every day [42]. However, skin cells intrinsically 
lack the capacity for having a valuable future. 
They can only be transformed into organisms 
having this potential. However, the same can be 
considered regarding embryos [46].It is discussed 
that embryos are not persons; there are also no 
sensible reasons not to destroy unwanted embryos. 
However, even if we are wrong, we may kill 
unwanted embryos in research because sometimes 
it is permissible to destroy beings including 
individuals that we have robust reasons not to kill 
[47, 48]. When embryos are not intended to form 
a family, they can possess still a certain moral 
value (i.e., a means for extension of knowledge 
and rescuing or enhancing people’s lives).It is 
wrong to employ wanted embryos for the purpose 
of research. Wanted embryos are valuable for their 
parents. Destroying these embryos harms the 
parents and violates their moral claim regarding 
what is done to the embryos they generate 
[49].Killing unwanted embryos with parents 
consented to their use and killing in research will 
not violate the parents’ claims. Moreover, such 
embryos are not humans and do not have any 
feature justifying not to kill them. Even if 
embryos are persons or beings, it is permissible to 
get rid of unwanted embryos in research. For 
example, this is when research increases the 
survival rate of embryo. The argument against 
destructive experiment on unwanted embryos is 
invalidated by three aspects. In contrast, there is a 
robust reason for conducting such studies, 
pursuing which may develop medical techniques 
that will succeed. It is still wrong to generate 
embryos ending up with death in research, 
although it is permissible to kill unwanted 
embryos. It is thought that it is permissible to 
generate embryos by IVF, knowing the reality that 
some will be killed for no reason but their storage 
seems impractical. If it is possible to generate 
embryos in these conditions, it is also possible to 
generate embryos that would be killed in 
experimental studies. So, the embryos will be 




destroyed to improve medical research, rather than 
emptying the freezer space, and they will be 
generated for a more valuable reason (i.e., for the 
improvement of medical treatments, rather than 
satisfying the desires of parents for having 
children) [50]. An argument states that, in the 
production of embryos for research, they are only 
used to benefit others, as they are not endowed 
any chance for survival. This problem can be 
simply resolved by randomly donating some 
embryos of research to infertile couples [50]. 
 
1. PGD for histo-compatibility purpose 
In parents who have a child with Franconia 
anemia, PGD bring about change for birth of a 
healthy child and the hematopoietic stem cells 
derived from heath infant umbilical cord which 
can save the life of histo-compatibility afflicted 
child  [51]. Carrying out PGD for having a healthy 
child with histo-compatibility with afflicted child 
was rejected as a source for donating 
hematopoietic stem cells for years and as yet in 
some countries such as Netherlands conducting 
PGD for determining histo-compatibility is 
forbidden. Number of malign and non-malign 
patients merely can be treated through bone 
marrow transplant and hematopoietic stem cells 
transplantation (HSCT). Since the HSCT success 
rate hinges on histo-compatibility extent between 
donor and donee and everyone has two types of 
HLA which is acquired half from mother and half 
from father. The chance of developing an embryo 
with compatible HLA with the afflicted child with 
Anemia Franconia is 25%, however, using this 
approach, it would be possible to transfer the 
embryos with full histo-compatibility with the 
afflicted child [52] 
In contrast, the opponents of PGD use for this 
purpose believe that only once the embryo should 
tolerate the risks from this technique that it is 
featured by abounding advantages while use of 
this method doesn’t include special gain for the 
selected embryo. However, conducting PGD and 
taking one or two cells from embryo in early 
stages of development doesn’t bring about special 
risk for the embryo. In fact, the embryo has been 
selected for its genetic features in PGD and the 
only advantage of PDG for the selected embryo 
for this purpose is the gift of being alive and life 
since without PGD performance, that embryo 
wouldn’t  exist. [53]. Another prominent ethical 
discussion in this regard is instrumental use of 
developed child through PGD and degrading the 
human honor and respect. In fact the parent 
intention for developing embryo is producing a 
source of organs or stem cell for transmitting to 
the afflicted child [54]. 
Definitively, when the parents’ decision in PGD is 
merely for donation of tissue to afflicted child and 
the child itself is not respected by parents 
independently as an honorable human being, this 
decision would be morally wrong. From other 
side, degrading the child to a member donation 
bank by parents given their hefty effort for 
rescuing the first child seems to be unlikely.  
Another reason of PGD performance opponents 
for HLA compatibility regards the parent intention 
for requesting PGD and the likelihood of this child 
from this technique feelings being hurt; however, 
the understanding that the PGD resultant child is 
developed from the intention of rescuing another 
afflicted child life can bring about feeling of 
satisfaction and self confidence in him, comparing 
with other people whose birth has no conscious 
intention and in fact is outcome of an accident, the 
donor child would feel esteem sense by perceiving 
its own reason of life. From other point, PGD 
opponents believe that parents’ intention for 
rescuing the afflicted child leads to developing a 
sort of pressure and responsibility on donor, 
especially in case that the transplantation wouldn’t 
be successful as in this case, the child fails to meet 
the parents expectations. Similarly, psychological  
effects of donation of bone marrow should not be 
neglected [55]. However, these effects hinges on 
conscious perception of donor child on the  
donation nature. At the beginning, youthfulness of 
the child thwarts his understanding of donation 
nature and its role in life donation to other; 
however, over time, the child would be able to 
understand his valuable role in life of another 
person [56]. 
 
2. PGD for gender selection purpose 
PGD related technology in the context of 
diagnosis of genetic disease and gender related 
diseases have had significant advancement, and 
sex selection often is used for removing the 
embryos with gender dependent genetic disease; 
however, the use of PGD for gender selection 
(unnatural) of embryo is forbidden in some 




countries, although this method is still done in 
many countries [57].  
When ethnical conflicts are considered about 
embryo sex selection this question comes to mind 
whether sex selection method for non-medical 
purpose (when sex selection is not for genetic 
disease prevention) is morally acceptable. 
Is it morally acceptable to use this approach for 
establishing gender balance in family? 
The proponents of using this approach believe that 
sex selection is among parent rights and 
consolidates the human autonomy and honor, and 
since this method doesn’t entail any risk for others 
it is in no conflict with moral principles. Although 
from individual viewpoint, gender selection by 
parents isn’t deemed as non-ethical practice, 
however, in the societies in which there is gender 
preference, sex selection can lead to gender 
imbalance [58]. Basically, embryo sex selection 
requesters for non-medical purposes are two 
groups. First group are those who consider the sex 
selection of their first child who usually (due to 
socio-cultural reasons) select male embryo. 
Second group are those that have a child and want 
a child with gender other than the first one [59]. 
Some scholars believe that PGD with non-medical 
purposes is considered as non-justified reason for 
sex selection especially if this selection takes 
place for the first child, leading to sex imbalance 
in society; moreover, PGD prevalence and sex 
selection of first child is ascertainment of gender 
preference which is common in some societies. 
However, sometimes in these societies having son 
is so important that it doesn’t justify developing 
and extirpation of embryo at very early stages (at 
eight cell stage) as in the case of prohibition of 
this method, there would be selected abortion risk 
[60].  PGD use for second child sex selection is 
usually done for establishing gender diversity in 
family and many psychologists believe that 
parenting experiences is different with son and 
daughter and gender selection in this group 
doesn’t represent sexism [59]. Now, is the 
tendency of parents for gender diversity (in family 
that doesn’t mean gender preference) a sufficient 
reason for generating and again extirpating the 
embryo? Some scholars believe that if parent’s 
tendency for sex selection in second child is so 
strong that inhibit them from having a child with 
undesired gender, thus one should consider the sex 
selection as permissible in this group [61].  
The opponent of PGD use for sex selection 
believe that attention to a special gender for any 
reason represents in fact the sexism and it is a 
violation to human rights. Basically, PGD is a 
technique for preventing birth of a child with 
genetic disease and it is definitely not merely for 
embryo gender and even the tendency to gender 
balance in family is sort of sexism.  
However, the proponent of this technique’s use for 
embryo sex selection believe that parents demand 
for gender selection in fact is parents’ autonomy 
increase and heightens the parents control on 
family setup and balance and curtails unbridled 
growth of population. [62] 
From another perspective, the accurate meaning of 
family balance is not properly clear. Accepting 
that family balance hinges on gender balance, one 
should admit that families with gender imbalance 
are somehow flawed. Similarly, one should notice 
that PGD use should not overshadow other moral 
principles such as equality (equality between men 
and women) and definitively only couples can use 
this technique who want a child with other gender.  
Nevertheless,, parents with gender selection in 
fact assign a special appreciation for child gender 
that is prior to appreciation of the child itself in 
psychosocial term. In fact, these parents have their 
own gender stereotype and have special 
expectation from a special gender which often 
leads to applying pressure and limitations on their 
child and sometimes the gender relation 
expectations and prediction cannot be fulfilled by 
children which may lead to heightened pressure on 
them [63].  
In the end, given the cultural issues in some 
societies, gender preference is not for family 
balance or meeting the parents tendency to a 
specific gender; rather, it is for meeting the 
society’s expectations from family and male 
gender selection by parents is a sort of 
consolidating the family social status [64] 
Ultimately, in such societies enacting restricting 
laws of embryo sex selection is not violation of 
self-authority principle of parents, as it is a 
decision based self-autonomy which is out of 
sway of intervening and social limitation and in 
the societies that there is a full preference on male  




gender, the decision of couple for gender selection 
doesn’t denote their self-authority; rather, it 
denotes the social compulsory forces and 




     This article is a review and it is developed from 
examining various MEDLINE sites and based on 
keywords PDG, medical ethics, gender selection 
and it is extracted from the numerous articles 
during recent two decades and are investigated.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
     All embryos may have an opportunity to 
survive and a chance to be destructed, like 
ordinary IVF embryos. It is argued that it is not 
correct to generate embryos for research since this 
means generating embryos with the purpose of 
destroying them. By contrast, in standard IVF 
cases, embryos are only produced for the sake of 
reproduction. An undesired side effect of IVF is 
destruction of some embryos. This would be 
regarded reasonable if it were wrong to kill 
undesired embryos during research; however, this 
is not believed so. It is permissible to destroy 
embryos in research once they have been created, 
if they are unwanted and with the consent of their 
parents. Therefore, in creating embryos for 
research, they are generated to be treated in 
permissible ways; it is hard to infer what could be 
wrong with that. Embryos have a particular moral 
importance when they are intended to extend a 
family. When they are not planned for the so-
called purpose, they may still have a specific 
moral value for extending knowledge and saving 
or improving people’s lives. 
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